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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
DENNIS A. TEIPEL, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
: Case No. 930494-CA 
Priority No. 2 
SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from judgment and conviction of burglary, a third 
degree felony, and possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B 
misdemeanor, in the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Michael R. Murphy, Judge, 
presiding. 
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Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114 
Telephone (801) 538-1022 
MANNY GARCIA (3799) 
431 South 300 East, Suite 101 
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SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
After defendant was apprehended and arrested, an inventory of 
the violated premises revealed many food items and other hardware 
had been stolen, including cases of soft drinks and flashlights. 
Defendant had none of the missing items, nor were they located. 
Defendant testified he entered through the broken window to 
conceal himself from public view and ingest cocaine. He no sooner 
entered than the police arrived. He hid behind the office door and 
was immediately arrested. No evidence was presented that defendant 
had actually possessed or used cocaine. All he had in his 
possession was paraphernalia. 
ARGUMENT 
THE COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON A LESSER 
INCLUDED OFFENSE. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Questions of law are reviewed for correctness with no 
deference given to the trial court. Sanders v. Sharp 806 P.2d 198 
(Utah 1991). 
Defendant was entitled to a jury instruction on the lesser 
included offense of Criminal Trespass, a class C misdemeanor. Utah 
Code Ann., § 76-6-206, in pertinent part, reads as follows: 
(1) For purposes of this section "enter" means intrusion 
of the entire body. 
(2) A person is guilty of criminal trespass if, under 
circumstances not amounting to burglary as defined in 
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Section 76-6-203, or 76-6-204: 
(a) he enters or remains unlawfully on property 
and: 
(i) intends to cause annoyance or injury to 
any person or damage to any property, including the use 
of graffiti as defined in Subsection 78-11-20(2); 
(ii) intends to commit any crime, other than 
theft or a felony; or 
(iii) is reckless as to whether his presence 
will cause fear for the safety of another; ... 
(3) (a) A violation of Subsection (2)(a) is a class C 
misdemeanor unless it was committed in a dwelling, in 
which event it is a class B misdemeanor. 
Trial counsel offered an instruction consistent with the above 
cited provision (T.188) which the court refused (T.190). 
In State v. Velarde 734 P.2d 440, 446 (Utah 1987), the Utah 
Supreme Court reiterated the criteria necessary for the submission 
of such an instruction. 
This Court in State v. Baker 671 P.2d 152 (Utah 1983), 
set forth the standards to be used to determine whether 
a jury should be instructed on lesser included offenses. 
If a defendant requests a lesser included offense 
instruction, as was the case here, an evidence-based 
standard controls. To determine whether an offense is 
included in a charged offense, the trial court must first 
decide whether the offense is established by proof of the 
same or less than all the facts required to establish the 
commission of the offense charged. If the same facts 
tend to prove the elements of more than one statutory 
offense and the evidence is ambiguous and susceptible to 
alternative explanations, the trial court must give the 
lesser included offense instruction if any one of the 
alternative interpretations provides both a rational 
basis for a verdict acquitting the defendant of the 
offense charged and convicting him of the included 
offense. Baker 671 at 158-60. See also State v. Oldroyd 
685 P.2d 551, 553-54 (Utah 1989). 
The State objected to the submission of the instruction, 
reasoning that the trespass instruction could not apply as a matter 
of law. The prosecutor reasoned that because defendant had 
admitted that he unlawfully entered the building for the purpose of 
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ingesting a controlled substance, defendant's acts would amount to 
a felony, therefore the trespass instruction could not apply (T. 
188-90). The court agreed and denied the defendant's request for 
the instruction. 
There can be no question that according to the Baker criteria, 
defendant was entitled to a lesser included instruction on an 
evidence-based standard. 
The elements of criminal trespass were shown by the same facts 
needed to show burglary. Unquestionably, defendant entered and 
remained in the building illegally. The only question went to his 
intent. 
The evidence of intent was also ambiguous and susceptible to 
alternative explanations. A jury could have rationally found that 
defendant had merely committed a criminal trespass. 
There was testimony that many items were missing from the 
building, including flashlights, two dozen sandwiches and cases of 
soft drinks. (T. 133; 140; 142.) 
There was no evidence that defendant had taken anything from 
the building, nor any evidence that accomplices were involved. 
Defendant's actions while inside, as witnessed by the police, 
were consistent with his explanation that he was attempting to 
conceal himself. (T. 91(L.20-21); T. 159(L.25), 160(L.l-3).) 
Given the opportunity, a reasonable jury could have found that 
defendant committed criminal trespass since there was no evidence 
of his intent to commit a theft, as charged in the greater offense 
of burglary. There was an alternative interpretation available to 
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provide a rational basis for a verdict acquitting defendant of 
burglary and convicting him of criminal trespass, based on the 
explanation that he illegally entered the building intending to 
conceal himself and inject drugs. (T. 166(L.18-20); 172.) 
The prosecutor's argument to preclude the instruction was 
erroneous because there was no independent evidence that defendant 
was intending to commit a felony. There lacked a corpus delicti. 
The only evidence relating to a felony came from defendant's 
statement, not from independent evidence. 
CORPUS DELICTI 
"...we adhere to the doctrine that there must be 
independent proof of the corpus delicti before the 
confession can be received for the consideration of the 
jury..." State v. Johnson 83 P.2d 1010, 1014 (Utah 
1938). 
In State v. Hansen 857 P.2d 978, 980 (Ut. App. 1993) the court 
revitalized the corpus delicti rule. 
"A post-crime inculpatory statement is sufficient to 
establish guilt of a defendant when there is clear and 
convincing evidence independent of the confession that 
the crime actually occurred." (Citing State v. Johnson 
821 P.2d 1150, 1163 (Utah 1991).) 
"An admission or a confession, without some independent 
corroborative evidence of the corpus delicti, cannot 
alone support a guilty verdict. To sustain a conviction, 
the requirement of independent proof of the corpus 
delicti requires only that the State present evidence 
that the injury specified in the crime occurred, and that 
such injury was caused by someone's criminal conduct. 
State v. Knoefler, 563 P.2d 175, 176 (Utah 1977); see 
also Johnson, 821 P.2d at 1162 n. 8. It is permissible 
to use reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence 
presented to establish the corpus delicti. See State v. 
Cooley, 603 P.2d 800, 802 (Utah 1979)." 
The State had no independent evidence that defendant had 
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possessed or used cocaine. The only evidence of cocaine came from 
defendant's post-crime statement. 
The evidence showed defendant possessed an empty syringe and 
a spoon. (T. 115, 116.) The prosecutor intimated there was "a 
substance" on the spoon (T. 117), but presented no proof, and there 
existed no independent evidence that it was indeed cocaine, save 
for defendant saying so. 
Therefore, the independent evidence did not show that 
defendant had entered either to commit a theft or a felony, merely 
that he entered and remained while in possession of paraphernalia. 
Possession of paraphernalia is a misdemeanor. Defendant's 
statement cannot be used to fill in the void in the corpus delicti 
of entering with the intent to possess or use cocaine. 
The court erred in refusing to give the instruction. It is 
very likely the jury had conflict without the lesser option because 
it was clear defendant had entered illegally. They knew he had 
done something wrong. With no evidence of theft, nor of any other 
felony, the jury could have certainly convicted defendant of 
criminal trespass if given the chance. They were unwilling to 
completely forgive defendant's unlawful entry. Defendant was 
certainly guilty of something. Without a choice, even though a 
rational basis existed for a lesser included, the jury convicted 
defendant of the greater offense. 
MODIFICATION OF JUDGMENT/CONVICTION 
The appellate court has general powers to modify criminal 
judgments, and may, if requested by the defendant, enter a modified 
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judgment and conviction. In State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1209 
(Utah 1993) the court stated: 
"If.. .an appellate court on appeal.. .shall determine that 
there is insufficient evidence to support a conviction 
for the offense charged, but that there is sufficient 
evidence to support a conviction for an included offense, 
and the trier of fact necessarily found every fact 
required for conviction of that included offense, the 
verdict or judgment of conviction may be set aside or 
revised and a judgment of conviction entered for the 
included offense, without necessity of a new trial, if 
such relief is sought by the defendant." 
Defendant asks this court to review the evidence presented and 
determine whether it presents a rational basis for a verdict 
acquitting defendant of burglary and convicting him of criminal 
trespass, and entering such judgment. 
In determining the existence of a rational basis, the 
reviewing court does not judge the credibility of the evidence, but 
only decides "whether there is a sufficient quantum of evidence 
presented to justify sending the question to the jury." State v. 
Baker. 671 P.2d 152, 159 (Utah 1983). Further, the court must view 
the evidence and the inference that can be drawn in the light most 
favorable to the defense. State v. Crick, 675 P.2d 527, 532 (Utah 
1983). 
Since the court erred in not instructing the jury on the 
lesser included and because a rational basis exists for a 
conviction on the lesser offense, defendant asks this court to 
modify his conviction and enter a trespass conviction based on the 
insufficiency of the evidence regarding defendant's intent to 
commit a theft or other felony. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing defendant asks the court to reverse his 
conviction for burglary and enter a judgment and conviction for the 
lesser included offense of criminal trespass in violation of 
Chapter 76-6-206 Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended). 
MANNY GARCIA^ v-=5* 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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